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ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines available industry data on two
profitability measures, the price—cost margin and the ratio of quasi—
rents to capital, for the purpose of determining the effect of unionism
on profits. Jt finds that unionism reduces profitability and that this
effect occurs in highly concentrated industries. The effect of
unionism is quite substantial in most calculations, suggesting that the
fraction organized in a sector be included in standard Industrial





Cambridge, MA 02138Despite a widespread belief among economists and businessmen
that trade unionism is inimical to profitability, neither labor
economists nor industrial organization specialists have seriously
examined the relation of industry profits to organization of the labor
force.1 Since, in theory, the effect of unionism on profitability is
ambiguous ——insome market situations unionism can raise profits by
acting as the monopolizing agent while in others it should have no
effect ——itis important to test the widespread belief and to estimate
the magnitude of the relation.
This paper seeks to fill the gap in our knowledge by analyzing
the impact of unionism on the profitability variables studied in
industrial organization, price—cost margins,' and quasi—rent returns
to capital as reflected in revenues minus costs per dollar of assets.
It uses two major bodies of data: the Internal Revenue Service balance
sheet data and the annual Survey of Manufacturing.
The major finding is that unionism has a statistically
significant quantitatively important depressant impact upon the
relevant profit indicators that holds up under various specifications
and is as or more robust than the widely—studied impact of
concentration on industrial profitability. In addition, the analysis
shows that the negative effect of unionism on industry profits is
limited to the more concentrated industries.
The finding that unionism reduces profits helps explain
extensive management opposition to unionism, despite the often higher
productivity associated with organization (see Brown and Medoff, Clark,2
Allen). Apparently managerial and union productivity or price
augmenting behavior is generally, though not always1 insufficient to
counterbalance the higher cost of union labor.
1. What Theory Says
While most economists would expect the wage increases due to
unionism to reduce profitability, such an effect is by no means
theoretically certain. Even in situations where all that unions do is
to raise labor costs, the effect on profitability depends on: the
period of analysis, market structure in the organized sector, and the
profitability measure under study.2 When firms are not operating at
optimal efficiency so that unionism is accompanied by productivity
advances as well as cost increases there is even greater ambiguity to
the profit effect. Moreover, when part of a sector is organized and
part is not, profitability is likely to be increased in the nonunion
part, raising the likelihood that industry profits will be higher.
Consider first the issues of market structure and the time
period of analysis. If a union organizes a competitive sector and
raises costs, it can either increase or decrease profits in the short—
run, depending on the demand and cost conditions in the sector.
Profits are likely to increase if the demand curve facing the sector is
inelastic, so that increases in costs which raise prices, also raise
total revenues. Essentially, union cost increases can bring the
industry closer to the price/output position of a monopoly in the
sector, with the monopoly profits divided between the union and the3
firms. To illustrate, let P =price,Q =quantity,W =wage,L =
labor,and let production be governed by Q =LaK1a where K is fixed.
Then profits (it)are
(1) it= PU—Wolta
Ifthe sector is competitive price is equated to marginal cost
(2) P W dL/dQ =W/a01/a —1
Substitution for WQhi'a in (1) yields
(3) =(1—a)PU
Here profits will rise in the sector whenever demand is inelastic.
(See Nelson 1957, for a general analysis). In the long run, with free
exit and entry, however, the reduction in profits will reduce the
number of firms and output until profitability is restored to
'competitive levels.'
By contrast, if the industry is already acting as if it was a
perfect monopoly, the union wage increase cannot raise profits. It
will necessarily reduce them since the monopolist is in the elastic
part of the demand curve. In this case, the union profit effect can
continue in the long run, as long as market conditions remain the same.
Profits will be reduced relative to what they would be in the
monopolistic sector in the absence of unionism but, assuming free exit,
will not fall below the competitive level.
In a recent paper Clark has pointed out that the effect of
union wage increases on profitability depend also on the measure of
profits used.In particular, he notes the 'anomalous' result in which
unionism lowers profits in a sector but where the ratio of profits to4
capital rises. In his case the decline in profits reduces the size of
the sector, with capital usage declining less in percentage terms than
does the level of profits, a result requiring an elasticity of
substitution less than one.3 In this case, profits divided by the
original capital stock are lower but profits divided by the capital
stock after adjustment are higher under unionism. By focusing on the
latter measure rather than the former one ignores capital losses to
fixed factors. The result does not imply that monopolies with low
elasticities of substitution will raise factor prices to raise
profitability: their concern is with total profits, not profits per
plant and equipment capital.
In sum, theoretical considerations suggest that one be careful
in analyzing the union—profitability relation, distinguishing between
sectors with different market conditions and between profit measures.
In this study I treat the market conditions issue by
differentiating between more and less concentrated sectors.While
there are well—known problems with concentration as a measure of market
power, it is the most widely studied indicatorof market power and is
generally found to have a moderate but persistent positiverelation to
profitability measures (see Weiss), which even criticsof the standard
interpretation of the concentration—profit relation admit(Peltzman).
I report some results with other market structure variablesfound in
the iadustrial organization literature, but as these yield comparable
findings with respect to unionism, I shall not place greatstress on
them.5
For profitability. I employ the 'price—cost margin, '(PCM)
defined as value added less labor costs (and less advertising costs)
divided by the value of shipments, and quasi—rents per unit of capital,
(QRC) defined as value added less labor (and advertising) costs per
dollar of asset. The price—cost margin is generally interpreted in the
industrial organization literature as a measure of the extent to which
a monopolistic sector raises prices over costs (capital held fixed)
beyond competitive levels. In a simple monopoly model the price—cost
margin depends on the elasticity of demand : EPIC =11(1—
Alternativelythe price—cost margin can be thought of as a measure of
profits per unit of sales. Despite criticisms of the P01 as a profit
indicator on various grounds (see Liebowitz), it continues to be widely
used, in part because it represents the best profitability measure in
the Census of Manufacturers and appears to yield similar correlations
with profit determinants as do quasi—rents per unit of capital.
While the QRC measure of profits has some desirable features,
in that it represents a return on capital, it also suffers from serious
drawbacks. It is not a rate of return in the theoretical sense of an
internal return. It involves division of profits by capital/asset
measures of questionable quality, due to capital stock valuation1
omission of intangibles (in the Survey of Manufacturers) and other
well—known problems (see L. Weiss).
Given the weakness of each measure of profitability, I examine
the impact of unionism on both and contrast results with those obtained
on the standard Industrial Organization variables in each case.6
2. Data
The empirical analysis uses two data sets containing measures
of profits or quasi—rents, capital. market structure,and unionization
of the labor force:
(a)Survey of Manufacturing (SOld) data, 1958—1976.The first
data set consists of a pooled cross section time seriesof observations
on 139 three digit industries from the annual Surveyof Manufacturing.
The Survey presents data on value added, value shipmentsand labor cost
to measure the price—cost margin and measureof quasi—rents. I augment
this data series with: estimates on capital in each industrryearcell
using data reported by the Bureau of LaborStatistics, as described in
detail in the data appendix. estimates of three digitconcentration
ratios, obtained as weighted averages of four digitrates, estimates of
the following other market structure variables,obtained from the
ilarvard University (PICA) data bank: minimumefficient scale, cost
disadvantage ratio, advertising/sales ratio,and absolute capital
requirements. Tbe unionism variable isobtained from the Freeman—
Medoff estimates for three digit industries, based on MayCurrent
Population Survey data.
The three digit SOld data set has both advantagesand
disadvantages for analysis. On the plus sideit provides a consistent
series of 'quasi—rents' and capital measuresunaffected by changes in
tax laws or distorted by inflation for a largenumber of industries.
On the negative side the measure of 'quasi—rents'includes overhead
expenses while the measure of capitalstock excludes all assets except7
for plant and equipment. Furthermore the data are limited to
manufacturing which has become an increasingly smaller component of
U.S. national product.
(b) Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on balance sheets and
assets in 68 industries from 1965 to 1976. From the IRS balance sheets
we have calculated a cash flow measure of profits: reported profits
before taxes plus depreciation plus interest payment1 and obtained
total assets and net depreciable assets. The industry concentration
and unionism variables are taken from the same sources as in the Survey
of Manufacturing data, but are bridged to correspond with the IRS
industry definitions.
The IRS data set addresses some of the problems in the SOM data
set but also introduces new ones. IRS data yield a quasi—rent measure
that approximates payments to capital instead of contributions to
overhead. And the data yield capital measures ranging from stock of
plant and equipment to total assets. On the negative side, industrial
organization experts cite three major problems (see L.W. Weiss) One,
accounting and managerial policy tend to equalize profit rates among
industries. Two, inflation distorts capital stock valuation. Three.
IRS reports company and not establishment data. Therefore, market
structure variables reflect conditions in the companies' most important
industry but not conditions in other markets of diversified firms.
The precise definitions of the variables used are given in the
data appendix.8
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the major
variables in the analysis and, to provide a guide to ensuing work, the
multivariate relationship between each of the variables and unionism as
reflected in the regression coefficient on unionism and the implied
level of the variable at 0% and 100% organization. These figures are
not meant to estimate the structural impact of unionism on therelevant
variables but simply to show k2!L they vary with unionism in the
samples.
jYhile there are differences in levels of variables due to
different definitions and groupings1 the two data sets tell a similar
story about the magnitude, variability, andlink to unionism of the key
variables.
First, the table shows considerable variation in the major
profitability indicators, the price—cost margin and quasi—rents per
unit of capital, providing the differences among industries necessary
for a fruitfui analysis. The levels of the profitability measuresdo,
however, differ greatly between the data sets,with both the price—cost
margin and quasi—rents per capital higher inthe SOM than in the IRS.
In the price cost margin this reflects lack of data on somecosts in
the SOld, while in the quasi—rent/capital measureit also reflects lack
of a complete accounting of the capital stock inthe SOM data: taking
net depreciable assets as an indication of the plantand equipment
capital in the SOM, upwards of three—fourthsof manufacturing assets
are not included in the SOMfigure.4 Because of these factors, the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SON, averages19% in that data set while quasi—rents per capital are
73%. These figures far exceed the comparable statistics from national
income accounts, a well—known result indicative of the aforementioned
data problems (see Brown and Medoff). Despite the problems, however,
the SOM data are valuable in providing a large number of industries and
years for analysis, we will develop a somewhatnovel model to treat the
data problems.
Nearly all of the variables are correlated with unionism. With
one exception.the correlations are in the expected direction, though
not of the same magnitude or significance, in the two data sets. The
exception is the gross value of log quasi—rents, which is positively
correlated with unionism in the SON, a result due to the industry
classification scheme as larger industries tend to be more heavily
unionized in that data set. More importantly, the SON and IRS data
show negative correlations between the relative profitability measures
and unionism which, however, are noticeably stronger in the IRS thanin
the SON data.
The capital intensity measures, capital per worker in the SON,
capital per sales in the IRS, are positively correlatedwith unionism,
as we would expect. The labor cost per workerand value added per
worker data in the SON show that unionized industries pay more for
labor and have higher gross' productivity.
Without claiming the data are optimal for examining the impact
of unionism on profitability, I believe they are adequate to provideat
least a crude indication of the linkage between collective organization11
in the labor market and profitability, on a par with studies of
concentration and other measures of the structure of the product market
and profitability which use essentially the same data sources.
3. Empirical Analysis
Table 2 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the
impact of unionism on profitability in the IRS data set. Regardless of
the measure of profits or control variables, the calculations tell a
clearcut story, showing that unionism reduces profits by significant
sizeable amounts.
Taking the quasi—rents/capital regression first we see in
equation (1) that unionism lowers profits per unit of assets by some
61% ( =1—exp(—.49))as one moves from 0% to 100% organization.
Equation (2) introduces a union concentration interaction term to see
if the negative effect of unionism on profitability is, as expected1
greater in the more concentrated sectors. The interaction term enters
significantly1 supporting this hypothesis. Equation (3) shows that the
negative effect of unionism does not disappear with addition of three
other widely used measures of product market structures.4
The result with respect to the price—cost margin in equatipns 4
—6are similar.
Table 3 presents a comparable analysis of profitability in the
Survey of Manufacturers data set. Here, the results with respect to
the price—cost margin parallel those given in the previous table:
unionism reduces profits, concentration raises profits, and there is a12
TABLE 2: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Profitability
Equations in IRS Data Set
Log Quasi—Rents/CapitalLog Price—Cost Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.Unionism —.49 —.01 —.45 —.58—.32—.53
(.05) (.17) (.05) (.05) ( .16)(.05)
2. Concentration .39 .73 .34 .72 .89 .61
(.05)(.13)(.06) (.06)(.12)(.06)
3.Capital/Business .68 .68 .74
Receipts (.01)(.03)(.03)




Advertising Intensity 3.06 2.28
(.46) (.48)
Absolute Capital Requirements .95 .79
(.18) (.18)
Relative Minimum Effect Scale —.15 —.11
(.03) (.03)
6. .32 .33 .40 .66 .66 .64
Note: All regressions include year dummies.13
TABLE 3: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Profitability
Equations in Survey of Manufacturers Data Set
Log Quasi—Rents/CapitalLog Price—Cost Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Unionism —.14 1.35 —.08 —.2J .03—.16
(.05) (.15) (.05) (.03)(.09) (.03)
2. Concentration —.90 .41 —1.23 .22 .64—.05
(.06) (.14) (.07) (.04)(.08) (.04)
3. Capital/Value of .17 .19 .21
Shipment (.01)(.01) (.01)
4. UnionismConcentration —2.72 .93
(.25) (.15)
5. Other Market Structure
Variables
Advertising Intensity 5.59 6.18
(.31) (.32)
Absolute Capital Requirements .54 .14
(.09) (.05)
Relative Minimum Effect Scale —.96 .19
(.19) (.11)
6. R2 .11 .15 .23 .17 .23 .29
Note: All regressions include year dummy variables.14
noticeable interactive effect. Addition of the other market structure
variables weakens the concentration variable much more than it did in
the IRS data but does not greatly affect the union impact. Theresults
with respect to the quasi—rent/capital measure of profitabilitydiffer,
however, in one remarkable respect. Whereas unionism continues to have
a negative estimated impact on profitability. so toodoes
concentration. Indeed, the negative relation between concentration and
profitability with this measure is extraordinarily strong. Why?My
first fear was that I made a gross error with the SO?'! data. After all,
a relation like this has certainly not been reportedin the Industrial
Organization literature. Several careful data checksuncovered no such
gruesome error. Examination of the literaturefound that one reason
for the lack of such a result in previous studies js that nearlyall
analysts using the Survey of Manufacturers datafocus on price—cost
margins, not the quasi—rent to capital return. The onestudy which
did, indeed, analyze the QRC, by Lester Telser, reports negative
correlations between 'contribution to overhead' and concentrationof a
magnitude similar to that in my data set. Telserdeals with the
problem by including 'payroll' as an additional capital measurein the
regressions. He argues that the standard plantand equipment capital
in the Survey is seriously incomplete by omission of intangible
'specific human capital,' which can be roughlymeasured by payroll.
Indeed, with addition of payroll, the positive relationbetween the QRC
and concentration is reversed. However, holding payrollfixed
essentially turns the QRC regression in a PC?'!equation.5 While this15
raises doubts about interpretation of Telser's regressions, I believe
the explanation of the aberrant finding does indeed rest on 'missing'
capital. If a significant amount of capital relevant to profitability
is omitted from the Survey of Manufacturers data, and if this capital
is negatively correlated with concentration, and is positively
correlated with profitability, the negative result in the QRC
regression could be attributed to the missing capital. Calculation
with the IRS data, which contains depreciable assets comparable to the
plant and equipment capital in the Survey of Manufacturers supports the
interpretation. First, the IRS data show that only 1/4 of total assets
are depreciable assets (the rest include inventories, intangible
assets, land, etc.),6 which suggests considerable 'missing' capital.
Second, the log of the ratio of depreciable to total assets is highly
significantly correlated with concentration: a regression coefficient
(standard error) of .51 (.07). whereas unionism is barely correlated
with the ratio 1.09 (.08)]. Third, the nondepreciable assets in the
IRS are correlated with profitability just as are the depreciable
assets.
As a test of the explanation, I re—estimated the QRC regression
in the IRS data, replacing total assets by depreciable assets. If the
essence of the problem lies with use of depreciable rather than total
assets, one should obtain a negative concentration—QRC relation in the
IRS data in this case. Indeed, the results show just such an effect,
with a coefficient on concentration of —.13 (.08) compared to the .39
(.01) obtained in Table 2. The union coefficient, by contrast, remains16
highly significantly negative.
There are two ways to adjust the SO?'! data for the missing part
of capital. One could use the IRS data to obtain the relevant
auxiliary regression coefficients to 'correct' the SO?'! results using
omitted variable bias formulae. Alternatively, one can modify the
profitability model to allow for an unmeasured capital effect on
profits. As the latter gives greater leeway to the SO?'! data to tell
the story. I follow this procedure.
An appropriate generalization of the profitability equation
used in the 5014 regressions is:





In (4) measured capital produces quasi—rents according to the
coefficient b and the coefficients on the interaction terms between K
and unionism and concentration. The coefficient f reflects the impact
of unionism on the return to capital, with b +fUNmeasuring the
marginal impact of a dollar of measured capital on quasi—rents, while
the coefficient e reflects the impact of concentration on return to
capital. Unionism, concentration and a constant enter the equation to
allowfor unmeasured capital and the possibility that either is related
to the amount or the returns to that capital:if the coefficients c
and d are negative (positive), we would infer that these is less (more)17
unmeasured capital, or that the unmeasured capital has alower (higher)
return in the more concentrated or unionized sectors.
Table 4 records the result of estimating (1) in theSOM data.
Consistent with our explanation of the aberrantconcentration result,
it shows a sizeable negative direct effect ofconcentration on the log
of quasi—rents but a sizeable positive interactionwith capital. The
estimated union effects are exactly the opposite, as mightbe expected.
The effects of the variables at the bottomof the table show that, at
the mean value, of capital. unionism redtices quasi—rentswhile so too
does concentration, consistent with the Table3 findings.
Whether one does or does not accept this explanationof the
aberrant result in the Survey of
Manufacturers, the important point is that evenin that calculation the
union effect is negative and interacts negativelywith concentration.
3. Assessina the Union—Profitability Relation
Granted that unionism has a negative effect on profitability
and that its effect differs between more and lessconcentrated
industries, is the effect limited to highlyconcentrated sectors where
profitability would otherwise be extremely high ordo unions also
reduce profits below normal levels in competitiveindustries? A priori
one expects the negative union impact onprofits to be especially
sizeable and in the long run limited toconcentrated or regulated
sectors, because a union profit effectin a truly competitive sector
would bring in nonunion competitors anddrive union firms out of18
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To see how unionism affects profitability in different types of
industries I have estimated the profitability regressions using a four
way classification of industries in place of unionism and
concentration, dividing industries into roughly equally numbered sets
as follows: low unionism —highconcentration, high unionism —high
concentration, high unionism —lowconcentration, and low unionism —
lowconcentration.
Table. 5 presents the results of these regressions in terms of
the estimated ln point difference in profitability between the high
unionism and low unionism parts of low and high concentrated sectors.
The results are clear: unionism has essentially no impact on
profitability in the more competitive sectors but a sizeable negative
effect in the concentrated industries. In all cases the highest
profitability is obtained for the high concentration —lowunionism set
of industries. In all but the aberrant quasi—rent to capital Survey of
Manufacturers regression, moreover, the reduction in profitability in
the high concentration —highunionism sectors is to irnormaJ.ir low
concentrated profit rates.7
While the profitability calculations indicate that unionism
reduces profits only in sectors whose industry market power creates
above—normal profits, it is still possible that there is a union effect
on competitive industries. Assume unionism reduces profitability in
the competitive sector, which drives out less efficient union fins.
If, as seems plausible, our data cover a period in which industries20
TABLE 5: TheDifferentialEffects of Unionism on Profitability, by
Concentration of Sector
Sample/Measure of Ln Point Difference in Profitability Between
Profitability Highly Unionized and Less Unionized Sectors




price—cost margin —.07 —
ManufacturingIndustries (Survey of Manufacturers)
quasi—rents/capital .00
price—cost margin —.01 —19a
Source: Calculated from Internal Revenue Service data and Survey of
Manufacturing data sets as difference between estimated
coefficients on low and high union dummy variables within the
sectors. Controls as in Tables 2 and 3.
a: Statistically significant at 1% level21
have fully adjusted to the economic effects of unionism, one would
expect little or no connection between unionism and profitability:the
effect is masked by the shrinkage of the sector. To see whether or not
such a shrinkage may have occurred, I have examined the relationship of
unionism and concentration to the growth of industries over the period
covered. The results differ between the SON and IRS data sets. In the
SON, the average annual compound rate of growth of value added from
1958 to 1976 was 5.1% in the low union—low concentration industries
compared to 4.5% in the high union—high concentration industries, which
might be taken to support the hypothesis that unionismshrinks the
competitive sector. In the IRS low concentration industries, however.
high union industries averaged a 3.1% increase in total receipts(1965
—1976)compared to a 2.7% increase for low union industries. By
contrast, both data sets show higher rates of growth in the high—
concentrated low union sector than in the high—concentrated—high union
sector (5.4 versus 4.3% in the SON, 6.7% versus 2.8% in theIRS) •8 The
variation in growth rates across industries is, however, quite great,
suggesting that our findings with respect to profitability are
reasonably robust with respect to differential union impacts on growth.
Other Studies
Our results on industry profitability can be compared to the
analyses of Richard Caves, Michael Porter, Michael Spence,and John
Scott on Canadian industries, Kim Clark on 'businesses,' Michael
Salinger on companies. and R. Rubach and N. Zimmerman onthe stock22
prices of companies undergoing union organizing drives.
All of these studies, while based on different data and models1
obtain the same basic conclusion: that unionism is associated with
lower profitability. Caves et. al. finds profits to be negatively
related to unionism in 85 or so Canadian industries in ordinary least
squares regressions of profit—on—sales, price—cost margin and profit—
on—equity on unionism and various industrial organization variables.
Clark finds profits to be negatively related to unionism in regressions
of price—cost, margins and quasi—rents/capital for 902 individual
'businesses in the period 1970—1980. However, contrary to our results
Clark finds the union impact on profitability to be greatest in less
concentrated sectors, a result due possibly to the unrepresentative
sample he uses (his 'businesses' are parts of large firms who provided
data for purposes of Strategic Planning) .Usinga different approach
in which the ratio of the stock market value of a firm to the
replacement value of its physical assets (Tobin's q) is taken as the
measure of profitability, Professor Michael Salinger of Columbia
Business School finds unionism lowers Tobin's q in a sample of 193
manufacturing firms. Supporting our finding on concentration,
moreover, Salinger finds that the union effect is greatest in
concentrated sectors, reducing the market value of a firm with monopoly
power relative to its replacement value. Finally, in an analysis of
the effect of union organizing drives on the value of a company's
stock, It. Rubach and M. Zimmermanfindsignificant negative impacts,
which suggest that the stock market at least regards union organization23
as harmful for profits.
Conclusion
This paper has examined available industry data on two
profitability measures, the price—cost margin and the ratio of quasi—
rents to capital, for the purpose of determining the effect of unionism
on profits. It has found that unionism reduces profitability and that
this effect occurs in highly concentrated industries. The effect of
unionism is quite substantial in most calculations, suggesting that the
fraction organized in a sector be included in standard Industrial
Organization profitability calculations in the future.24
FOONOTES
1. Unionism is included as a variable in one analysis of Canadian
industry profitability by Caves et. al. It has been examined as a
determinant of company profitability by Clark and Salinger.
2. It can be readily demonstrated that organization of a single
competitive or monopolistic firm will suffer profit losses when a
union forces wage increases on it.
3. See Clark.
4.The interested reader will note that two of the three measures
obtain conceptually sensible signs: advertising intensity, which
obtains a uniform positive coefficient in all calculations1 and
absolute capital requirements, positive in three of four
regressions but negative in the 5024 price—cost margin regression.
By contrast relative minimum efficient scale does not. The
strongest and most striking 1—0 variable in these calculations is
the advertising intensity measure, supporting the Comonor—Wilson
analysis of that variable's impact on profitability.
5.With payroll fixed, the return depends on the markup of price over
unit cost and the capital to sales ratio, which is held fixed in
the usual price—cost margin regression.25
6. It is possible but unlikely that unions could organize a fraction
of new entrants, maintain a constant share of industry output, and
have a negative effect on profits. To do this requires
considerable organizing activity, and is likely to result in weak
unioni sm.
7. In the IRS data set log total assets of companies average 15.50
whereas log depreciable assets averages 14.lS producing a
difference of —1.35 so that net depreciable assets are just 26j of
total assets. The actual regression coefficients and standard
errors are:
Quasi—Rents/ CaDital
All industries: low union high union
low concentration — .05(.03)
high concentration .20 (.03) —.03 (.02)
Manufacturing Industries
low concentration — .00C .04)
high concentration .02 (.03) —.28 (.03)
Price—Cost Margin
All industries:
low concentration — —.07(.03)
high concentration .23 (.03) —.01 (.03)
Manufacturing Industries
low concentration — —.01(.01)
high concentration .17 (.01) —.02 (.01)
8. Calculated for 68 industries in IRS data and for 124 in SOM data.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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DATAAPPENDIX
Internal Revenue Service 1965 —1976;industries
Variables: Definition and Source:
Adv/sales Advertising purchased by business
receipts!! [IRS Corporate Source
Book; PICA data base: lIES].
Adjusted number at markets An average (weighted by the value of
shipments comprising the IRS
industries) of the number of markets
in the Continental United States
according to Weiss' cutoff points.
The adjusted number of markets
equals one if the Weiss' number is
fonr or less. [Weiss, "The
Geographic Size of Markets in
Manufacturing," Review of Economics
and Statistics 1972, PICA: 1185].
C4 Shepherd A four firm concentration ratio
derived from the average (weighted
by the shipments of 4 digit
industries comprising the IRS
industries) of Shepherd's adjusted 4
digit 1966 concentration ratios for
geographic dispersion and product
market definition. [Shepherd, Market
Power and Economic Welfare)
C4 1972 A four firmconcentrationratio
derived from the weighted average at
4 digit, 1972 Census of
Manufacturers C4 concentration
ratios for value of shipments. [1972
Census of Manufacturers; PICA: 1185]
Union Percent of all workers covered by
collective bargaining agreements
obtained from a weighted average of
the Freeinan/Medoff estimates.
Minimum Efficient Scale (lIES) A weighted average of the ratio of
the shipments of plants in
employment size class containing
median shipments divided by the
number at plants in this class.
[1972 Census of Manufacturers; PICA: UBS].1-1
Relative MES A weighted average of the ratio at
MES divided by total industry
shipments. Total Industry Shipments
equals the sum of shipments in all
employment size classes with ten or
more employees. [1972 Census of
Manufacturers; PICA: BBS].
Adjusted Rel MES The product of relative l.IES times
adjusted number of markets.
Union*Conc The product of union times C4
Shepherd or C4 1972.
Capital, Depreciable The difference of depreciable assets
minus accumulated depreciation in
constant 1972 dollars. [IRS
Corporate Source Book; PICA: BBS].
Capital, Total Assets Total Assets which includes both
current and fixed assets in constant
1972 dollars. [IRS Corporate Source
Book; PICA: BBS].
Quasi—Rents Total Revenue —totaldeductions
plus interest paid plus depreciation
in constant 1972 dollars. [IRS
Corporate Source Book; PICA: BBS].
Capital*Conc The product of the Shepherd's or
Census' concentration measure times
the log of capital.
Capital*Union*Conc The product of Union'Conc times the
log of capital.
Capital Requirements The product of Relative MES times
the log of capital.
Capital*linior, The product of Union times the log
of capital.
Capital*Adv/Sales The product of advertising/sales
times the log of capital.
Capital/Sales Capital divided by business receipts.
Price/Cost Margin Quasi—Rents divided by business receipts.
Quasi—Rents/Capital Quasi—Rents divided by Capital.111
Surveyof Manufacturers 1958—1976; industries
Mv/VS A weighted average of the
Advertising/Value of shipments ratio
obtained from the BEA input/output tables.
Advertising Expenditure The product of value of shipments
times Adv/VS.
Adv/VA Advertising divided by value added.
Adjusted number of markets See (Adjusted Number of Markets:
IRS) weighted by value of shipments
of 4 digit industries comprising 3
digit industries.
C4 Shepherd Same as IRS definition.
C4 1972 Same as IRS definition.
Union Same as IRS definition.
Minimum Efficient Scale Same as IRS definition.
Relative 1'TS Same as IRS definition.
Adjusted Ret MES Same as IRS definition.
UnionConc Same as IRS definition.
Capital The net stock of capital measure is
derived by a perpetual inventory
method that accumulates net deflated
investment flows at plant and
equipment. Net stock of plant and
equipment represents the value of
capital assets in constant 1972
dollars adjusted for both discards
of worn out assets and loss of
efficiency in production. [Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Capital Stocks
tape; PICA: BBS].
Labor Costs Payroll plus supplemental labor cost
for the years 1972—1976. Before
1972. labor costs equals payroll
times the ratio of Labor cost to
payroll in 1972. In constant 1972











Note: The IRS corporate source book provides concordances among 1963.
1968, 1973 IRS Industry classifications and between 1972 Census
of Manufacturers 3 digit and 1973 IRS classifications. An
Appendix of 1972 Census of Manufacturers provides a concordance
between 1967 and 1972 4 digit industry classification.
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The product of Adv/VA times the log
of capital.
The product of Adv/VS times the log
of capital.
Quasi—Rents divided by value added.
Quasi—Rents divided by capital.
The GNP price deflator for years
1958—1976. [Economic Report of the
President, 1980].